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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether female earnings have influenced 
divorce rates in Australia, using state-level data for the past four decades. Following a 
recent study by Ressler and Waters (2000), which concludes from comparable US 
data that female earnings and divorce rates may be jointly endogenous, initial testing 
is performed to identify whether female earnings can be treated as exogenous. A 
Hausman specification error test finds no evidence of a simultaneous relationship in 
the Australian data, in contrast to the findings of Ressler and Waters. The test result 
supports the hypothesis that other underlying factors affect female earnings, of which 
higher divorce rates are merely another symptom. A divorce rate equation is 
estimated. In accordance with much of the literature, the rise in female earnings over 




Marriage has long been a revered social institution. Often portrayed as the 
embodiment of commitment and devotion, it lays a foundation for lasting 
companionship and the rearing of children. Of the many aspects that generate the 
cherished notion of “family”, few tend to be more important than marriage. Despite 
these traditional sentiments, the sanctity of marriage has been challenged in the past 
few decades, as the number of people marrying has stagnated and divorce rates have 
increased. The patterns of marriages and divorces in Australia from 1961 are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
  There are common causal factors for changes in trends to marry and divorce. 
However, the rise in marriage breakdown has typically attracted more focus because 
of the greater problems it is perceived to create. Depression and other psychiatric 
problems, social withdrawal, child abuse, and drug use have all been mooted as 
consequences of family failure (Pell 2001, p15). 
 
Figure 1 

















Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Marriages and Divorces, Canberra, 1995; 1999. 
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Given these issues, it is not surprising that divorce has come to the attention of 
an economic profession increasingly ambitious to apply economic theory to explain 
behaviour outside the monetary market sector. During the past three decades, much 
empirical literature has emerged testing and refining Becker’s (1973) seminal paper 
propounding a theory of marriage consistent with other decision-making 
methodology. By assuming various characteristics of the marriage ‘market’, Becker 
derives several conclusions about ‘gains from marriage’. Such gains arise from the 
division of labour between the husband and wife in market and non-market work, and 
‘marriage’ capital. Specialisation gains result in part from the male-female wage 
differential. ‘Marriage’ capital, or non-transferable commodities produced in a 
household, similarly enlarges these gains.  
Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) extend this theory and test its pertinence 
using 1967 US census data. Rising female wages are found to increase the probability 
of divorce. Many subsequent studies, including Smith (1997), also find that higher 
women earnings were positively related to divorce rates. By concluding that state 
population densities affect divorce rates among ‘farm’ marriages, Sander (1985) infers 
that the divorce rate is significantly and substantially affected by the earning capacity 
of women in the marketplace. Lower population densities are thought to imply greater 
isolation for farm families and hence reduce the ability of ‘farm’ wives to reach 
working premises. The literature does not entirely support economic explanations of 
divorce, however. Hoffman and Duncan (1995) conclude that divorce rates are driven 
by changes in behaviour rather than economic factors. Analysing first marriages 
begun in the US between 1967 and 1983, the authors find male incomes, wages and 
welfare payments largely irrelevant to marital instability.  
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A continuing issue of concern has been the possible endogeneity of various 
factors modelled in divorce equations. Johnson and Skinner (1986) test whether the 
labour supply of married women and the future probability of divorce are jointly 
determined by using a simultaneous equations model on 1972 data. They find that 
married women expecting divorce do indeed increase their labour market 
participation, but that higher participation in the job market itself does not affect the 
probability of divorce.  
Using state-level U.S. Census data, collected at four different census times, 
Ressler and Waters (2000) adopt a simultaneous equations model with the divorce 
rate and female earnings as the jointly determined variables.  Apart from divorce rates 
being influenced by higher female wages, the authors hypothesise that greater female 
earnings may be partly attributable to higher divorce rates. Ressler and Waters find 
that simultaneity does exist between divorce rates and female wages rates. From this 
result they infer that previous studies of divorce rates may suffer from simultaneity 
bias, overstating the positive impact of female earnings on divorce. 
To our knowledge, the relationship between divorce rates and female earnings 
has yet to be explicitly investigated using Australian data. This paper adds to the 
literature by exploring possible links in Australian state-level data. We seek to 
determine whether growing female earnings have contributed to the rise in divorce 
evident in Figure 1. To do so, we evaluate whether female earnings are endogenous, 
hence testing the robustness of the findings of Ressler and Waters. We find that 
female earnings do appear to have influenced Australian divorce rates, but there is no 
evidence to suggest female earnings and divorce rates are jointly determined.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, models of the 
aggregate divorce rate and of average female earnings are devised. Section 3 contains  
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a discussion of the econometric issues that arise and how these are addressed. Results 
from empirical tests and regressions are reported and analysed in Section 4. Some 
concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. 
2.  The Model and Data 
Models of divorce rates and female earnings are developed in this section. The main 
focus is on estimation of an equation to explain divorce rates. A model for female 
earnings is constructed to test for simultaneity between divorce rates and female 
earnings and to provide suitable exogenous variables as instruments for this test. The 
two models are discussed in subsections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Each section 
contains details of the variables, and the data used to construct them; a comprehensive 
listing of data sources appears in the Appendix. 
2.1   A model of divorce 
According to Becker, Landes and Michael (1977), divorce is optimal when the sum of 
the values of post-divorce opportunities, including the option value of remarriage, net 
of divorce costs, exceeds the joint value of the current marriage. This rule requires 
that utility be transferable within the marriage. With costless bargaining, the gains to 
marriage can be redistributed in such a way that divorce only occurs when the joint 
benefits exceed the joint costs (Peters 1992 p437). In the notation of Weiss (1996 
p112), divorce becomes optimal when: 
   (, , , ) wt ht t t ht wt t t AA CV X X K +−≥ θ                      (1) 
The value of the marriage ( ) t V  is a function of the personal characteristics of the 
husband ( ) ht X  and the wife ( ) wt X , the level of marital capital,  t K , and the quality of 
the match,  t θ . The variables  wt A  and  ht A  represent the outside opportunities of the  
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wife and husband respectively;  t C  is the cost of divorce and includes legal costs, the 
loss of marriage specific capital, and personal costs. Divorce occurs endogenously 
whenever the couple cannot find an allocation within the marriage that dominates the 
divorce allocation (Weiss 1996 p110). Variables change in an unanticipated manner 
through the course of the marriage, as denoted by the subscript “t”.   
This model can be applied to test whether factors that might affect the value of 
each state impact on divorce activity. However, as Smith (1997 p535) has 
emphasised, the use of aggregate data precludes such models from including many 
relevant considerations. For couples, these include sexual satisfaction, courtship 
length and spousal differences in religion and education. Personal characteristics such 
as previous marital status, pre-marital pregnancy, and age at first marriage are also 
precluded from an aggregate framework. So precise measurement of  t θ  becomes 
improbable. Instead, general characteristics of the populace must be used, from which 
inferences about the marital gains can be made according to economic theory.  
In this paper we hypothesize that state-wide divorce rates can be expressed as: 
(- , - , , ,
-, , , , )
DIVRATE f FEM EARN REL EARN ASIAN CATHOLIC
MALE UN NUPBIRTHS RURAL WELFARE QLD
=
 
A discussion of each of these variables and the data used follows. Data were compiled 
for each state in each of the five-yearly census years from 1961 to 1996, making a 
total of 48 observations. 
Ideally, the dependent variable would measure the number of divorce actions 
initiated in each census year. The only data available - the annual number of decrees 
absolute issued - is subject to inertia in delays in judicial and institutional processing 
(Smith 1997 p536). DIVRATE is the proportion of married people becoming divorced  
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each census year. People designated as “permanently separated but not divorced” 
have been extracted from the married population and are essentially treated as 
divorcees. Further transformations used to derive DIVRATE values are described in 
the Appendix. The mean value of DIVRATE among the six states over the eight time 
periods is shown in Table 1. It peaked in 1976, declined sharply, then gradually 
increased again. 
FEM-EARN, the average real weekly earnings of full-time, non-managerial 
female employees aged over 21, is perhaps the most representative of aggregate 
income measures. Managerial employees were excluded because their incomes can 
artificially inflate the average wage, as has been recently argued (Gordon and 
Robinson 2001). Nominal values have been deflated by the CPI in each state’s capital 
city over the 1961-1996 period. FEM-EARN proxies for the conceptually desired 
variable - the average ‘potential’ market earnings of all married adult women (Smith 
1997 p534). Higher female earnings are believed to diminish marital gains by 
reducing the demand for children and improving the opportunities for women outside 
marriage. For these reasons, improving economic conditions for women since the 
 
Table 1.    Sample means of variables in divorce-rate model averaged over states 
for each census year. 
  1961  1966  1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
DIVRATE  (%) 0.29  0.37  0.44 1.95 1.22 1.15 1.25 1.41 
FEM-EARN  ($)  205.37  214.48  276.92 465.14 467.85 467.62 449.88 487.04 
REL-EARN  (%) 60.60  63.72  66.53 86.97 87.18 96.45 97.92 89.68 
ASIAN  (%)  0.68  0.79  1.14 1.47 2.03 2.70 3.39 3.82 
CATHOLIC  (%) 23.08  24.31  25.06 23.70 23.85 23.85 25.11 24.61 
MALE-UN  (%) 2.88  1.31  1.48 3.78 6.01 9.16  10.70  8.99 
NUPBIRTHS  (%) 19.35  16.76  16.17 13.55 12.06 11.80 10.71 10.47 
RURAL  (%)  21.89  20.14  17.19 16.42 16.62 16.87 17.11 16.27 
WELFARE  (%) 21.86  35.51  32.53 33.56 31.73 36.33 39.53 35.29  
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1960’s have been cited as a significant contributor to the increasing divorce rate. 
FEM-EARN is therefore expected to have a positive coefficient. Its rise from 1961 is 
highlighted in Table 1. 
Advantages accrue from a sexual division of labour within the marriage when 
male and female wage rates differ. A large relative male rate of pay encourages 
husbands to specialise in the market sector, with their wives specialising in household 
production. REL-EARN endeavours to capture specialisation gains by measuring the 
relative weekly earnings of full-time, non-managerial females to males. With 
exception of the years 1961 and 1966, when only total earnings were available, the 
earnings exclude overtime pay, to avoid any distortion being generated from males 
working longer hours. Higher relative earnings will erode gains from the sexual 
division of labour, implying that the value of the marriage declines. A positive sign is 
predicted on the coefficient of REL-EARN. It has experienced a similar rise to FEM-
EARN from 1961, apart from the decline that occurred in 1996. These features are 
shown in Table 1. 
Empirical research suggests that people of different racial origin have varying 
propensities to divorce. Kidd (1995) and Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) observe 
lower divorce hazard rates for people of Asian descent relative to other racial groups. 
Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) find Asian women are more than twice as likely not 
to experience a divorce as white women. ASIAN is included to accommodate these 
differences. It is the proportion of the state population born in the Asian region, and is 
expected to negatively affect the divorce rate. ASIAN rises steadily over the years 
from 1961 to 1996, as indicated in Table 1. 
  CATHOLIC is the proportion of the state population nominated as Catholic, 
including Roman Catholic. Faced with a disapproving religion, Catholics may face  
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higher personal costs from divorce. Yet not all people designated as Catholics 
stringently follow its doctrine. CATHOLIC counts all people professing to be 
Catholic, although it would ideally include only those who are devout. Nevertheless, 
CATHOLIC is still a useful measure and should have a negative coefficient. Its mean 
has remained near 24% throughout the relevant period, as reported in Table 1, but 
there are state differences in the percentage. 
Male unemployment unanticipated at the time of marriage causes a negative 
shock to the value of the married state (Becker, et al., 1977 p1161). MALE-UN is the 
male unemployment rate at the time of each census. It is expected to have a positive 
influence on the divorce rate. As shown in Table 1, MALE-UN remained relatively 
low until 1976, rising steeply to a peak in 1991 before declining somewhat in 1996.  
Marital-specific commodities are those assets whose value diminishes outside 
the marriage. The most cited example is young children. The economic theory 
predicts that couples with children have greater marital gains than their childless 
counterparts. A suitable regressor would therefore measure the percentage of 
marriages in each Australian state that contain a child from that union. Alterations to 
ABS measurements from 1961 to 1996 make this impossible to obtain. Instead, 
NUPBIRTHS is used as a very crude proxy. NUPBIRTHS is derived by summing the 
annual tally of nuptial births registered in each state over a period of four years, 
concluding with the census year. This aggregate is then averaged over the married 
population. At any census date, and assuming children remain in their state of birth, 
NUPBIRTHS is the number of nuptially-born children aged four or under per married 
person. It is expected to have a negative influence on DIVRATE. As illustrated in 
Table 1, the mean of NUPBIRTHS has steadily declined over the sample period.  
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There are some problems with the variable NUPBIRTHS that deserve more 
acknowledgment. Firstly, the distribution of young children across marriages is 
disregarded. A state recording a higher NUPBIRTHS value may actually have fewer 
marriages containing children, if those children are concentrated in a smaller number 
of marriages. If Becker’s (1977) hypothesis that the first two children discourage 
marriage more than additional children is accepted, then nuptial births that occur in 
marriages already containing children should not be weighted as heavily as first-child 
births. Secondly, NUPBIRTHS will include children conceived outside the marriage, 
but whose parents subsequently married following knowledge of the pregnancy. 
Accidental premarital conception increases the probability of dissolution because it 
raises the search cost of finding a suitable mate (Becker, et al., 1977 p1164). 
Therefore, unmarried prospective parents are more likely to accept marriage offers of 
lower value. This aspect will mitigate the anticipated negative relationship between 
DIVRATE and NUPBIRTHS. 
Following the work of Sander (1985), RURAL is the proportion of the 
population living outside urban centres with 1000 people or more, as defined by the 
ABS. It proxies for the number of “farm” marriages in each state, a variable whose 
relevance stems from Sander’s hypothesis that farm marriages were less likely to end 
in dissolution. Married women dwelling outside urban centres have limited exposure 
to market work, thereby reducing opportunities outside marriage. Couples in rural 
areas are also likely to exploit the gains from specialisation within marriage to a 
greater degree. For these reasons, it is anticipated that RURAL will have a negative 
impact on DIVRATE. However, this negative impact may decline as the number of 
people living in rural areas increases, as this may actually present greater 
opportunities outside the marriage for ‘country’ wives. RURAL is expected to have a  
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negative but diminishing effect on the divorce rate. This effect can be captured by 
including linear and reciprocal terms, with both expected to have positive coefficients. 
From Table 1 we see that the RURAL average declined from 1961-76, thereafter 
increasing except for a small decline in 1996. 
Welfare payments may encourage divorce by improving post-divorce 
opportunities. The Commonwealth Government assumed responsibility for the 
pension scheme for divorced women and their dependent children in June 1942. 
Although nominal payments spanning the desired period are therefore identical across 
states, payments in real terms and with regard to opportunity costs are dissimilar. 
Disparities arise in real values because of the unique CPI movements in each state. 
The value of pensions must also be assessed in a context mindful of the husband 
income they are likely to replace. The pension scheme considered is the maximum 
weekly payment to divorced and unemployed mothers with one child under five. 
WELFARE is this pension payment in real terms, as a percentage of the average 
“ordinary time” income of full-time adult non-managerial males in each state. It is 
expected to positively influence DIVRATE. The WELFARE mean jumped sharply 
upwards after 1961, but from then on fluctuated between 31% and 39%, as indicated 
in Table 1. 
State-specific cultural climates can be important determinant of regional 
propensities to divorce. Ressler and Waters (2000) find that a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 for deeply religious states and 0 otherwise is significant in their model. 
Queensland is more conservative than other Australian states, which may lead it to 
have lower divorce rates than elsewhere. QLD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
state is Queensland and 0 otherwise.   
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The scarcity of useful observations encountered in this project make it 
imperative to include all possible comparable data. However, extending the study to 
include data from the 1961 and 1966 censuses raises some issues of concern in the 
sample composition. Aborigines were not officially recognised as Australian citizens 
until after 1967; censuses prior to that year exclude Aborigines from all published 
aggregate measures. It is worth considering the impact of this omission on the sample. 
Some American studies report that African-Americans have a higher 
probability of divorce than the white population. Johnson and Skinner (1986) found 
that non-whites have a higher divorce rate by roughly four percentage points, although 
this parameter was not significant. Such findings have been attributed to the increased 
marital instability that accompanies poorer living and working conditions. America’s 
blacks and Australia’s indigenous population share similar socio-economic 
characteristics in their respective countries: higher relative poverty and unemployment 
rates, with lower life expectancy. If such traits lead to divorce, then Australian 
Aborigines may have a higher divorce rate relative to the white population. Under 
such circumstances, the ratio of the population of Aboriginal descent would therefore 
be a valid regressor. The data set cannot accommodate such a variable. Instead, it is 
assumed that the impact of different Aboriginal populations on the divorce rate for 
each state is negligible, implying that pre-1967 data is comparable with the rest of the 
sample. 
2.2   A model of female earnings 
An equation for female earnings is formulated to accommodate the possibility that 
divorce rates and female earnings are simultaneously determined. If female earnings 
is found to be endogenous in the divorce rate equation, then, to obtain consistent  
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estimates, this equation needs to be estimated using a technique such as two-stage 
least squares or instrumental variables. It is hypothesised that: 
-(, , - , ,
,, )




Assessing the simultaneity issue is equivalent to asking whether DIVRATE should 
appear in this equation. Ressler and Waters (2000) hypothesise that divorce leads to 
women being more career conscious, and thus higher earners. Accordingly, DIVRATE 
should positively influence FEM-EARN. There are counter arguments, however. 
While it may be true for some females that divorce encourages a career focus, for 
others divorce may stunt professional careers as single mothers may be forced to leave 
work to care for children. Also, Ressler and Waters’ contention implies that a female 
divorcee would earn more than an identical but married counterpart; that female 
divorcees and childless wives should have substantial differences in income. 
Overlooked is the possibility that FEM-EARN and DIVRATE are influenced by 
common causal factors. A prime example is children. It may be an absence of children 
that allow women to focus on careers, not divorce. If the presence of children affects 
both female earnings and the likelihood of divorce, then divorced women may be 
earning more because they have no children, which contributed to their divorced 
status. Conversely, married women may remain married because they have children, 
increasing marital gains but reducing their income. So DIVRATE may not actually 
affect FEM-EARN; rather, any underlying relationship could be entirely driven by 
other considerations. 
EDUCATION is the proportion of the female population with a bachelor or 
higher degree. Its 1961 value was unavailable and was estimated by assuming the 
percentage change from 1961 to 1966 was the same as that from 1966 to 1971.  
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Economic theory dictates that academic qualifications increase the earning potential 
of workers. The sharp increase in EDUCATION from 1961 to 1996 shown in Table 2 
is expected to have contributed positively to the rise in FEM-EARN.  
FEMALE-UN is the unemployment rate of the female workforce at the time of 
each census. A high unemployment rate could reflect an excess supply of labour, 
which would decrease FEM-EARN. As shown in Table 2, FEM-UN remained steady 
until 1971, increased through to 1986, and then declined gradually.  
Because women who give birth must withdraw from the workforce, childbirth 
is viewed as sacrificial in terms of income. FERTILITY is the number of births in the 
census year divided by the female population of that state. As demonstrated in Table 
2, the mean of FERTILITY has declined strongly  over the sample period. 
  Greater access to employment opportunities increases earning 
potential.  METRO is the proportion of the state female population living in 
settlements containing a population of greater than 100 000, accordingly to ABS 
definitions. After an increase in 1961, the mean of METRO stabilised at around 58-
59%, as shown in Table 2. METRO should have a positive influence on FEM-EARN. 
 
Table 2.    Sample means of variables in female-earnings model averaged over 
states for each census year. 
  1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
FEM-EARN  ($)  205.37 214.48 276.92 465.14 467.85 467.62 449.88 487.04 
DIVRATE  (%)  0.29 0.37 0.44 1.95 1.22 1.15 1.25 1.41 
EDUCATION  (%)  1.71 1.96 2.65 3.58 6.39 8.54  13.02  18.51 
FEM-UN  (%)  2.82 2.36 2.18 4.88 7.23 9.19 9.04 7.98 
FERTILITY  0.0474 0.0397 0.0433 0.0335 0.0326 0.0312 0.0300 0.0278 
METRO  (%)  53.50 58.16 59.32 59.80 58.67 57.89 58.19 58.09 
LABOURERS  (%)  14.11  13.20  11.54 9.25  7.96 13.87 9.67 11.51 
SERVICE  (%)  17.54 16.50 16.33 14.77 14.75 15.57 15.46 21.41  
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Earnings differ across occupational groups. In the last three decades women 
have increasingly secured high-earning occupations, causing an increase in FEM-
EARN. High wage jobs typically refer to professional and managerial positions. The 
proportion of women in these occupations are not included as regressors because there 
will be a high degree of multicollinearity between these variables and EDUCATION. 
Women have increased their representation in high paying jobs substantially because 
they have accumulated greater educational qualifications. Hence EDUCATION will 
capture most all of the effects of additional women being employed in high wage 
occupational groups. 
  The same cannot be said for low wage occupations, which the model 
endeavours to represent with LABOURERS and SERVICE.  LABOURERS is the 
proportion of the state female workforce employed as labourers and basic production 
process workers. SERVICE measures those working in rudimentary service 
occupations, including maids, cooks and waitresses. Both of these variables are 
expected to have a negative impact on FEM-EARN. The average of LABOURERS 
declined steadily from 1961 until 1981, and has fluctuated since. New standards for 
job classifications that began in 1986 (discussed below) might explain these 
variations. The mean of SERVICE fell slightly from 1961 to 1991 but experienced a 
strong rise in 1996. 
Classifications for occupational groups changed twice in the period under 
scrutiny, with different occupational groups used in Census publications from 1961-
1981, 1986-91 and 1996. The procedure for creating a coherent set of data is 
described in the Appendix.   
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3. Econometric  Issues 
The data set is a pooled one containing observations on 6 states from 8 censuses. This 
pooled nature of the data raises questions about choice of a model specification and 
statistical assumptions to accommodate the different time series and cross-sectional 
components. For some of the possible alternatives, see Griffiths et al (1993). With a 
total of only 48 observations, the scope for sophisticated modelling is limited. In each 
equation the equation errors were assumed to be uncorrelated with zero mean and 
with a variance constant over both time and states. Intercept dummy variables were 
used to model differences over time in the DIVRATE equation and differences over 
time and states in the FEM-EARN equation. 
 In  the  DIVRATE equation there are likely to be influences not captured by 
other regressors that cause the divorce rate to change over time. The social stigma 
attached to divorce has decreased since the 1960’s, yet this change in attitude cannot 
be clearly quantified a priori. Time varying intercept terms are appropriate to capture 
this change. Intercept values are assumed constant across states in the DIVRATE 
equation, with the exception of Queensland, as discussed previously.  
State intercept dummies are included in the FEM-EARN equation as FEM-
EARN might differ across states for reasons other than those explained by the 
quantitative regressors. Victoria and New South Wales have capital cities that far 
exceed the size of those in Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. The 
largest firms tend to centre their Australian operations in Sydney or Melbourne. The 
higher wages typically available as a result may boost female earnings compared to 
other states. Some women with greater earning capacity may actually relocate to New 
South Wales and Victoria for these reasons. METRO makes no allowance for the 
overall magnitude of metropolitan centres other than having population of greater than  
 17
100,000. Industry structures also differ across states. Female earnings could partly 
depend on the performances of industries that are unevenly distributed across states. 
Factors such as these should theoretically lead to different intercept terms across 
states; dummy variables for each state are thus appropriate. Ressler and Waters (2000) 
excluded state dummies from their female earnings equation, and their results may be 
contingent on this omission. 
The possible endogeneity of FEM-EARN in the DIVRATE equation is tested 
using a Hausman specification error test. Various versions of this test are available. 
The one adopted is that described by Maddala (1992 p395). The predicted values of 
FEM-EARN, denoted by ~FEM-EARN, are obtained from its reduced form equation 
and then used as a regressor along with the original explanatory variables in the 
estimation of the DIVRATE equation. Significance of the t-statistic for the ~FEM-
EARN coefficient suggests there is a simultaneity problem. A lack of significance 
means there is no firm evidence that FEM-EARN is endogenous and hence no 
evidence that DIVRATE should be included in the FEM-EARN equation. 
4. Results 
The first result examined was that for the Hausman specification test. The t-value on 
the variable ~FEM-EARN was -0.0072, with a corresponding p-value of 0.99. Thus, 
there is no evidence to suggest that FEM-EARN is endogenous. This finding of no 
simultaneity is incongruent with the results of Ressler and Waters (2000). Given that 
Ressler and Waters excluded state dummy variables in their FEM-EARN model, 
further testing was performed to see whether this difference may be the source of the 
conflicting conclusions. Intercept shifting, state dummy variables were dropped from 
the original FEM-EARN model to generate an alternate set of predicted values. When  
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the Hausman specification error test was performed using these values, a t-value of 
0.300  (- v a l u e 0 . 7 7 ) p =  was obtained. The outcome of the test is robust to the 
exclusion of the state dummy variables. Thus, it was concluded that FEM-EARN 
could be treated as exogenous in the divorce rate equation, and this equation was 
estimated using ordinary least squares. 
  Table 3 contains least squares estimates of three versions of the divorce 
equation and the t-values corresponding to these estimates. In Regression 1 all 
variables discussed in Section 2 and all the time dummy variables are included. In 
Regression 2 the number of time dummy variables is reduced from 8 to 3, so that the 
equation has a pre-1976 intercept, a 1976 intercept, and a post-1976 intercept. 
Regression 3 continues with the reduced number of intercepts and also excludes the 
variables ASIAN and WELFARE. In addition to the coefficient estimates, the Table 
contains the adjusted 
2 R ’s, the F-values for testing the null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients are zero, Jarque-Bera values for testing normality of the errors, and the 
results from Ramsey RESET tests, testing for model misspecification by the addition 
of fitted squared predictions. These statistics show, respectively, the equations fit the 
data well, the null hypothesis of zero slope coefficients is rejected, there is no 
evidence against normality of the errors, and no obvious model misspecification.  
  In Regression 1 a relatively large number of coefficients is being estimated 
with a relatively small number of observations. Also, many variables will suffer from 
some degree of multicollinearity; NUPBIRTHS and FEM-EARN are examples. Thus, 
efficient estimation is difficult and this fact is reflected by small t-ratios on several of 
the coefficients. Two steps were undertaken to improve the efficiency of estimates by 
reducing the number of variables to be estimated. These two steps led to Regressions 
   
 19
Table 3   Estimated equations for divorce rate 
 
Regressors    Regression 1    Regression 2    Regression 3 

























1976   0.0045 
(0.231) 









1986    -0.0054 
(-0.277)    0.0104*       0.0115** 
1991    -0.0055 
(-0.276) 
(1.819) (2.108) 














FEM-EARN    0.2607 
(0.728) 
      0.1567** 
(2.119) 
      0.1268** 
(2.063) 
REL-EARN    -0.0154 
(-0.952) 
         -0.0186*** 
(-3.482) 
        -0.0158*** 
(-4.199) 
ASIAN    -0.0072 
(-0.276) 
  -0.0069) 
(-0.406) 
 - 
CATHOLIC    -0.0068 
(-0.822) 
  -0.0064 
(-0.909) 
  -0.0062 
(-1.087) 
MALE-UN         0.0439** 
(2.515) 
        0.0378*** 
(3.103) 
        0.0325*** 
(3.327) 
NUPBIRTHS    -0.0035 
(-1.270) 
     -0.0518** 
(-2.495) 
         -0.0641*** 
(-4.985) 
RURAL         0.0334** 
(2.510) 
       0.0384*** 
(3.339) 
        0.0419*** 
(4.043) 
1/(RURAL)           0.0012*** 
(3.007) 
         0.0013*** 
(3.476) 
        0.0014*** 
(3.755) 
WELFARE    0.0227 
(0.542) 
  0.0045 
(0.754) 
 - 
QLD    -0.0006 
(-1.086) 
  -0.0007 
(-1.504) 
  -0.0007 
(-1.609) 
Adjusted 
2 R    0.9789    0.9801    0.9808 









RESET F value 
(p value) 
  1.651 
(0.209) 
  2.010 
(0.165) 
  1.882 
(0.179) 
Notes:   t-statistics in parentheses with:  ***    = 0.01 level of significance   
          **      = 0.05 level of significance    
*        = 0.1 level of significance  
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2 and 3. First, Wald Tests were performed on the 1961 to 1996 dummy variables, to 
examine whether some time varying intercepts were statistically identical, and thus 
worthy of amalgamation. Second a “general to simple” approach to estimation was 
adopted. To overcome problems with omitted variable bias, regressors were not 
dropped from the equation on the basis of insignificance alone. Their theoretical 
foundation for inclusion and the adjusted 
2 R  resulting from their exclusion were also 
considered. This step dilutes the affect of multicollinearity as well as increasing the 
degrees of freedom. 
The null hypothesis of the 1961, 1966 and 1971 intercept terms being equal 
could not be rejected at a 10% level of significance, with an F-statistic of 0.09. 
Similarly, the null hypothesis of the 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996 coefficients being 
identical could not be rejected. In that case, the F-statistic was 0.95. These tests 
suggest that different intercepts exist for three time periods only: 1961-1971, 1976, 
and 1981-1996. This result is fitting, given ‘no-fault’ divorce was introduced 
throughout Australia in 1975. The ‘no fault’ divorce principle means divorce can be 
granted once applicants demonstrate the marriage has irretrievably broken down, 
usually evidenced by spouses living apart for 12 months. 
Regression 2 displays results for the DIVRATE estimation when dummy 
variables with statistically identical coefficients have been consolidated into single 
terms. More efficient estimates are therefore obtained. Comparing the coefficients of 
the consolidated dummies for the 1961-71, 1976 and 1981-96 periods, it appears that 
liberalising divorce procedures caused a positive shock to the divorce rate. Smith 
(1997) observed similar outcomes in Britain, and hypothesised they were due to a 
clearance of long-dead marriages. The failure of the post-1976 intercept term to return 
to its earlier level indicates the new legislation has also had a long-run positive impact  
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on divorce rates. Hence, the results support claims that the era of no-fault divorce has 
seen a new plateau in the incidence of divorce become established in Australia 
(Carmichael, et al, 1996 p4). 
  In Regression 2, the coefficients of ASIAN and WELFARE are not significantly 
different from zero, and their sequential exclusion from the equation led to increases 
in the adjusted 
2 R . Thus, they were omitted from the equation, leading to the results 
reported as Regression 3. ASIAN did have the anticipated negative coefficient, but its 
insignificance means this result only weakly supports the view that people of Asian 
descent have lower inclination to divorce compared to other racial groups. With 
respect to WELFARE, the literature reports mixed findings on the influence of such 
factors on divorce rates. Peters (1992), and Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) both 
detail a negative but insignificant influence of welfare-type measures on divorce rates. 
Hoffman and Duncan (1995) find they have a positive but insignificant impact. 
Curiously, Ressler and Waters (2000) find that growing welfare payments had a 
negative and significant effect on divorce rates over the past four decades. Our results 
for WELFARE join most of these reports in inferring that welfare payments have had 
only a weak influence on marital instability. 
  In Regression 3, the coefficients of CATHOLIC and QLD remain insignificant, 
but they are retained because they have the anticipated signs and omitting them will 
lead to a reduction in the adjusted 
2 R . It is difficult to assess ‘religiosity’ by simply 
measuring the percentage of Catholics in a state. When modelling divorce hazard 
rates, Johnson and Skinner (1986) found an irregular affect from a ‘Catholic’ variable, 
although a ‘frequent religious attendance’ variable had a negative and significant 
impact. The mild evidence that QLD has a negative impact on divorce rates could be 
attributed to ‘conservatism’, but it also could be attributed to the fact that Queensland  
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has an older population. A recurring finding in the literature is of higher relative 
divorce rates among those who marry at a young age. The higher probability of failure 
is attributed to each partner having inferior information concerning their spouse and 
their own needs. The information deficiency typically leads to ‘young’ marriages 
containing partners of less compatibility than marriages of older men and women. The 
variable  QLD could be picking up this effect because of Queensland’s older age 
profile. 
 Although  FEM-EARN consistently has a positive coefficient, it only becomes 
significant once the intercept terms are consolidated. Regressions 2 and 3 show that 
FEM-EARN has a positive and significant impact on DIVRATE. Rising female 
earnings appear to have contributed to the increase in divorce in Australia. These 
results concur with common findings in the literature. 
  REL-EARN has a coefficient significantly different from zero in Regressions 2 
and 3, and a negative coefficient, implying that the rise in divorce has not been driven 
by greater sexual equality in earnings. The signs of the REL-EARN and FEM-EARN 
coefficients suggest that increasing independence of women in the form of higher real 
wages has been the major force behind marital instability. Diminishing specialisation 
gains from the division of labour actually appear to reduce the divorce rate, once we 
control for the presence of young children through the variable NUPBIRTHS. 
  NUPBIRTHS has a significant coefficient of expected sign. Using the more 
appealing variable of “the percentage of married couples in each state with children 
under six”, Ressler and Waters (2000) obtain exactly the same result. It appears that 
despite being a crude proxy, NUPBIRTHS may accurately reflect the desired variable. 
Divorce rates appear to be positively influenced by the male unemployment rate,  
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given that MALE-UN has a significant and positive coefficient in every regression. 
Studies using aggregate and micro-set data commonly find this result. 
 Both  RURAL and (1/ ) RURAL  have significant coefficients and the expected 
positive signs. The impact of RURAL on DIVRATE is a diminishing negative one as 
was hypothesized, up to the proportion  0.18 RURAL = . Thereafter it is positive. This 
outcome can be explained by another characteristic of rural life that may lead to 
higher divorce rates. People living in rural areas face higher search costs when 
selecting a mate; their search will therefore be briefer and they may settle for a partner 
that is ultimately unsuitable. As noted by Sweezy and Teifenthaler (1996), the 
divorce-deterring impact of extra martial gains from rural living can be offset by the 
divorce-raising prospect of high search costs.  
  To ensure least squares would be an appropriate estimation technique for the 
divorce rate equation, we began this section by testing whether FEM-EARN could be 
viewed as exogenous. Since the final estimated equation was not the one initially used 
to test for endogeneity, it is reasonable to ask whether the decision to treat FEM-
EARN as exogenous would have still been made if the test had been performed on 
Regression 3. Repeating the test on this equation using the two alternative fitted series 
for FEM-EARN gave t-values (p-values) of 1.70 (0.097) and 1.74 (0.090). Thus, the 
null hypothesis that FEM-EARN is exogenous was again not rejected at the 5% level 
of significance. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
Several empirical studies, not all at the aggregate level, have demonstrated a statistical 
causal relationship linking female earnings to divorce rates. Yet the literature 
examining possible simultaneity of these variables is comparatively meagre. Studies  
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are also rare for countries other than the US and the United Kingdom. Using 
Australian data, in this paper we find that rising female earnings have partly 
contributed to the increase in divorce over the past four decades. These results join a 
large body of literature that is generally supportive of these findings and the economic 
theory. The paper also tests whether average female earnings and aggregate divorce 
rates are jointly endogenous, thus testing the robustness of the results of Ressler and 
Waters (2000). Their theory prescribing aggregate divorce rates as determinants of 
female earnings can be questioned. Increases in female earnings may be driven by 
factors other than divorce but which impact on both. One example is the presence of 
children. Also, the net effects of divorce on female earnings may cancel out at the 
aggregate level. Testing of the theory is ultimately an empirical question. The analysis 
provided in this paper is restricted by the use of aggregated data and limited 
observations. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated that divorce rates do not necessarily 
affect female earnings. This supports the hypothesis that rising divorce rates have had 
little or no influence on the steady increase in female earnings at the aggregate level. 
The finding is robust to minor model alterations; namely, whether or not state dummy 
variables are included when modelling female earnings. 
  Further research directed towards analysing relationships between such 
variables as fertility rates, female earnings, divorce and education within an enlarged 
data set is needed. In particular, an investigation using a micro data set would be 
appropriate. A thorough analysis of the interplay between education, children, divorce 
and earnings would require such highly detailed information. Of these relationships, 
perhaps the most illuminating would result from modelling differences in earnings 
between childless female divorcees and childless wives. This task is especially 
challenging for Australia given the lack of appropriate data at the micro level.  
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Empirical studies of a greater pool of countries would also enhance understanding of 
the topic.  
Appendix 
Sources of data 
Divorces:  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Marriages and Divorces, 
Canberra, 1995; 1999. 
Nuptial births and fertility rates:  CBCS,  Victorian Yearbook, Canberra, 1963; 
1968; 1973. ABS, Victorian Yearbook, Canberra, 1978; 1983. ABS, 
Births Australia, Canberra, 1987; 1992; 1997. 
Female earnings and males earnings:  CBCS, Survey of Weekly Earnings and Hours 
– Australia, October 1962; 1966; 1971. ABS, Earnings and Hours of 
Employees: Distribution and Composition, Canberra, May 1976; 1981. 
ABS, Distribution and Composition of Employee Earnings and Hours – 
Australia, Canberra, May 1986; 1991. ABS, Employee Earnings and 
Hours Australia, Canberra, May 1996.  
Proxy for 1996 occupations according to ASCO classifications:  ABS, Labour Force 
Statistics, Canberra, August 1995. 
Welfare payments:  CBCS,  New South Wales Yearbook, Canberra, 1965; 1968. 
Department of Social Security (DSS), Annual Report 1979-1980, 
Canberra, 1980. DSS, Annual Report 1991-92, Canberra, 1992. 
Department of Family and Community Services, Annual Report 1998-
99, Canberra, 1999. 
All other demographic statistics: Commonwealth Bureau of the Census and Statistics 
(CBCS)  Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30
th June, 1961,  
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Volumes I-VI, Canberra, 1963. CBCS, 1966 Census, Volume 1: 
Population: Single Characteristics, Parts 1-11, Canberra, 1969. CBCS, 
1971 Census, Bulletin 1: Summary of Population, Parts 1-6, Canberra, 
1972. ABS, 1976 Census: Population and Dwellings: Summary Tables, 
Canberra, 1979. ABS, 1981 Census: Summary Characteristics of 
Persons and Dwellings, Canberra, 1983. ABS, 1986 Census: Summary 
Characteristics of Persons and Dwellings, Canberra, 1989. ABS, 1991 
Census: Census Characteristics of States, Canberra, 1993. ABS, Census 
1996: Selected Family and Labour Force Characteristics for Statistical 
Local Areas, Canberra, 1998. ABS, Census 1996: Selected Social and 
Housing Characteristics for Statistical Local Areas, Canberra, 1997. 
Calculating divorce rates 
The ABS classifies divorces according to their state of registration, which is based on 
the location of the Family Court where the divorce is granted and registered. Divorces 
need to be measured by state of usual residence. Only for the years of 1993 and 1994 
have divorce data been published by both state of residence and state of registration. 
For some states, there is a substantial discrepancy between these figures. To counter 
this problem, the following procedure was adopted. The ratio of divorces granted by 
state of usual residence to state of registration were calculated for 1993 and 1994, and 
averaged for each state. These state-specific ratios were then multiplied to the 
published divorce figures for every relevant year. 
Labour Force Calssifications 
Prior to 1986, the Classification and Classified List of Occupations (CCLO) was used 
to code occupations. The Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) 
replaced this system in 1986. A new method of categorising occupations was then  
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introduced in 1996. Figures for each coding system are incomparable. Tables 
published in 1986 coded occupations according to both the ASCO and CCLO 
systems. These were used to obtain 1986 CCLO statistics. Furthermore, the number of 
workers in each CCLO grouping was calculated as some ratio of those in the ASCO 
grouping most closely resembling the CCLO job category. These ratios were 
multiplied to the ASCO figures for the most similar occupational grouping published 
in the 1991 Census and the August 1995 Labour Force publication. The latter source 
was used to proxy for possible 1996 ASCO statistics, to avoid similar problems 
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